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Governing mobility in times of crisis: practicing the border and embodying 
resistance in and beyond the hotspot infrastructure 
  
The European Commission’s (EC) choice of the term ‘hotspot’ for the block’s policy 
response to the 2015 border crisis is revealing. In its general use, the word refers 
either to an area or position of heightened risk or danger, or to a point on a surface 
that is of higher temperature than its surroundings. In geology, the term refers to places 
on the earth’s surface where a plume of hot rock in the mantle gives rise to volcanic 
eruptions. Whether deliberate or not, the use of the word in relation to the management 
of migration and borders appears to trade on a combination of these ideas and, by 
implication, a hotspot is a site of both unusual danger and uncontrollable pressure. 
Quite tellingly, the EC document announcing the hotspot approach never explains or 
defines the ‘hotspot’ itself. It is only in the implementation of the hotspot approach that 
islands and even regions are defined  as ‘hotspot areas’ – a striking example of a 
governmental technology creating the object which it intends to govern: 
[A] ‘hotspot area’ means an area in which the host Member State, the 
Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States 
cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate 
migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of 
migrants arriving at the external borders (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, 2016, 
Chapter 1 Article 2(10)) 
The papers in this special issue critically explore this ‘hotspot approach’ by 
dissecting its implementation and reverse-engineering the governance logics that 
underpin it. A seemingly new form of border infrastructure and bordering practice was 
developed by the EC in response to increased migration across the EU’s southern and 
eastern borders in 2015-16.  This ‘hotspot approach’ was presented as a novel 
governance mechanism that would bring closer and more efficient cooperation 
between European agencies and ‘frontline’ EU member states. The European 
agencies involved are the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex (the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency), Europol (the EU’s law enforcement 
agency) and Eurojust (the EU agency for criminal justice cooperation). According to 
the European Agenda on Migration, proposed by the EC in May 2015, under the 
‘hotspot approach’ these agencies work on the ground with the frontline Member 
States “to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants” (EC 2015). 
Arriving migrants are then sorted into categories: asylum claimants are processed by 
EASO, while Frontex “help[s] Member States by coordinating the return of irregular 
migrants” while the role of Europol and Eurojust is to tackle “smuggling and trafficking 
networks” (ibid). The hotspot approach therefore represents a further Europeanisation 
of migration and asylum governance. This is a process that commenced in 1999, when 
the European Council first agreed to establish the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS). Then, in 2010, EASO was established and became operational the following 
year. Its initial role was to assist and support member-states in the implementation of 
the CEAS. However, its competence expanded significantly in 2015 with the adoption 
of the European Agenda on Migration and the introduction of the hotspot approach.  
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On the ground, the implementation of the hotspot includes the construction or 
re-purposing of physical infrastructure to serve as reception and processing facilities 
in places close to the landing sites of large numbers of migrants. These facilities are 
also themselves referred to as ‘hotspots’. So a ‘hotspot’ has come to mean, 
simultaneously, the point on the EU’s border of supposed migratory pressure, the 
governance approach for addressing such supposed pressure, and the physical site 
where arrivals are processed and classified. Physical reception and identification 
centres have since been set up in Italy in Sicily (Trapani, Pozzallo and Messina), 
Lampedusa, and Taranto, and in Greece on the Aegean islands of Lesbos, Chios, 
Samos, Leros and Kos. Their stated purpose is to provide temporary accommodation 
and rapid processing of asylum claims in order to facilitate their relocation across the 
EU or the quick return of those whose claims for asylum were denied. However the 
sites have come to be associated with squalid living conditions, bureaucratic delays 
and long periods of detention in which people wait in limbo with inadequate access to 
health care, education and legal advice. By the end of 2019, less than 100 migrants 
lived in the Italian hotspots. However, in Greece, in 2020 the situation remains acute 
with 20,000 people living in the Moria camp on Lesbos, a facility intended to house 
3,100 (Chapman, 2020). 
         With these in mind, the contributions to this special issue dissect the hotspot 
approach in order to unravel the mechanisms of power that are awakened to 
administer the response to the collective movement of migrants. Managed as a 
protracted crisis, the EU distributed 23.3 billion euros to member-states over the 
course of the five years since 2015 for the management and humanitarian protection 
of asylum seekers and refugees. In this way, the hotspot approach – working in 
tandem with humanitarian governance logics such as those of rescue, interdiction, 
humanitarian assistance and long term encampment – has constructed and 
consolidated the dividing lines between those who deserve protection (refugees) and 
those that do not (migrants). Five years into its implementation, those arriving and 
caught up in the hotspot system are still being warehoused where they are not wanted, 
pushed back to where they came from and constantly moved around at will. With the 
introduction of fast track asylum procedures and geographical movement restrictions 
on the islands, hotspots have become spaces where exceptional rules apply and 
where mobility is explicitly targeted. With an emphasis on ‘stemming the flows’, 
individual member-states attempt to quell public fears over the newcomers. As people 
still arrive on the Greek islands, Italy and Spain, and as the geopolitical tensions feed 
the spectre of new conflicts in the region, the contributions published here are more 
relevant than ever.  
In this context, and as European institutions adopt an ever-more managerial 
and instrumental approach to issues related to migration, our special issue makes a 
timely and critical intervention to established narratives and ideas about the 
governance of moving populations and borders. By combining a view from below, from 
the everyday level of implementation and the impact on the lives of those subjected to 
it, with a view from above and the macro level of governance and state logics, the 
special issue builds a holistic and critical picture of the EC’s approach. This allows the 
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reader to engage with the racial and colonial assumptions that inform border politics 
in Europe today. Our collective aim here is to confront and intercept the knowledge 
produced about the border and tackle the established one-sided approach that treats 
migration as a ‘problem’ to be solved at all costs.  
In the past couple of decades, Europe has time and again experienced 
moments of increased migrant mobility, which have in turn caused the continent’s 
national and supranational governance apparatus to go into crisis mode. The digital 
narratives, language and imagery (Chouliaraki and Georgiou, 2019) deployed during 
these border crises usually include rickety and overcrowded boats landing on member-
states’ shores: for example, in the Canary Islands in 2006, when over 30,000 migrants 
from Africa arrived in a single year1; and in 2015-2016 when over 1,000,000 people 
arrived at the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos and Leros2. Similarly, 
collective border jumps at land borders, such as at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and 
Melilla, are also a recurring theme. Such moments make the border visible in a way 
that evokes an emergency. The ways in which authorities respond to this emergency 
depends, among other things, on who the border-crossers are and how deserving they 
are perceived to be. These recurring border crises are products of the EU’s border 
policies. They mark moments of rupture in the seemingly orderly governance of the 
border, warranting specific interventions (Mountz and Hiemstra, 2014; Williams, 
2017). Against the backdrop of a decade of austerity, political upheaval and 
secessionist tendencies, a steep surge in xenophobia, racism and populism has taken 
place in many EU member-states. As a result, national borders, as everyday means 
to govern and regulate migrant mobility, are ever-increasingly linked to these rising 
politics of fear and xenophobia, and discourses of crisis (Bobić and Janković, 2017). 
This has signalled a proliferation of practices and spaces of confinement for arriving 
migrants at and beyond the border, including hotspots, transit and reception centres, 
off-shore, extraterritorial, temporary and mobile detention facilities. 
The lockdowns imposed around the world have disrupted our common 
assumptions and misconceptions around these issues, revealing much deeper 
patterns and trends in border management. Some of the public health, physical 
distancing and surveillance measures may seem exceptional, far-reaching and 
unprecedented. However, they build on pre-existing trends, ideologies, expertise and 
technologies, and will have future implications for the governance of human mobility 
and the deterrence of unwanted migration alike. For example, the deployment of police 
on high streets, neighbourhoods, buses and squares, as well as strategic mobility hubs 
such as highways, ports, toll and service stations, requiring people to justify their 
movement, all build on existing trends of everyday bordering (Yuval et al. 2017). This 
refers to border-work (Rumford 2008), all those border-related daily and mundane 
practices (Białasiewicz, 2012; Ozdemir and Ayata, 2017) that target racialised migrant 
bodies and their movements in everyday life (Johnson and Jones, 2014; van Houtum 
 





et. Al, 2005) and urban spaces (Fauser, 2017; Lebuhn, 2013): the workplace, the bus, 
our squares, the supermarket. The border is polymorphic (Burridge et al., 2017), highly 
fragmented (Amoore et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2011) and ephemeral (Mountz, 
2011), and it is performed prosaically every day (Salter, 2008). It is in itself an 
instrument of power, functioning through the reproduction of hierarchies of class, race 
and gender (Yuval-Davis, 2013), overwhelmingly marking the experiences of those 
living on the margins of our societies while often sustaining a humanitarian claim for 
responsibility over the lives of the most vulnerable among them. 
Contemporary bordering practices have incorporated and instrumentalised 
elements of humanitarian care. The maritime operations of the EU’s border agency, 
Frontex, in the Mediterranean Sea have for the past two decades been presented in 
the language of humanitarianism and human rights (Perkowski, 2018). The 
humanitarianisation of border enforcement (Williams, 2015) has emerged as a morally 
defensible strategy for both states and border patrol agents, despite the rising death 
toll from sea crossings. In linking these seemingly contradictory objectives, 
governments encourage indifference to the lives of particular populations (Basaran, 
2015) while simultaneously producing the figure of the migrant as a helpless victim in 
need of rescue (Little and Vaughan-Williams, 2017). Non-governmental organisations 
are also implicated in the government of borders, as states rely on them to provide 
technical expertise and training for improving their mechanisms of response, such as 
emergency preparedness plans and technological solutions for registrations 
(Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010). In some cases, their presence is deemed necessary 
in the absence of state authorities or institutions that can provide assistance to those 
stranded in border areas, detained indefinitely or destitute. The five Aegean islands in 
particular have become paradigmatic spaces of humanitarian interventions 
(Dijstelbloem and van de Veer, 2019), where the provision of medical and legal 
assistance, food and sanitation is intertwined with demands for biometric registration, 
surveillance and detention. 
The linkage of control over migrant mobility and the securitised provision of care 
to those in need follows the lineage of historical instances when those “from below” 
saw their demands conceded to, only to then rematerialise in a more sinisterly 
advanced version of the exploitative status they had risen against in the first place. 
The response of the EU and its individual member-states to this most recent border 
crisis is consistent with this history. The hotspot approach is a flexible and ad hoc 
governance mechanism that categorises migrants and increasingly denies them a 
stable life and routes to safety. Its obsession instead with fast-track procedures and 
frameworks, often lying outside formal legislative scrutiny, builds an ever more 
managerial approach to migration. It also allows states, local authorities and European 
street-level bureaucrats to blur and obfuscate the lines of accountability and 
responsibility. Rather than giving people respite from movement, hotspots ensure they 
keep moving, often at a moment’s notice and without their families.   
This special issue builds on the fact that the EC hotspot approach is much more 
than a physical infrastructure at the geographical borders of the EU, one that functions 
to temporarily contain migrants at the gates. The contributions here distinctly and 
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decidedly demonstrate that the hotspot symbolises a profound and constant 
reconfiguration of the relation between rights and territory, and a redefinition of who 
has the right to have what rights. In this way, the EC hotspot approach provides the 
foundation for a new relationship between territory and rights. Founded at the 
intersection of humanitarianism and security (Papada et al., this issue), the hotspot 
further entangles care and control by creating sociopolitical distancing when 
geographical distancing is not possible (Pallister-Wilkins, this issue). It reaches far 
beyond the confines of the walls of the physical infrastructure to contain those on the 
move without necessarily detaining them (Tazzioli & Garelli, this issue). However, 
resistance is still practiced every day opposing the hotspot logics (Spathopoulou and 
Carastathis, this issue), which include the desubjectification, dehumanisation at the 
border. Subversion is found in radical place-making tactics that create truly safe 
spaces for migrants (Sparke & Mitchell, this issue).  
This special issue offers these five different critical takes on the ‘hotspot 
approach’, examining this both as a construct that is compartmentalising and 
controlling, as well as a source of awe and fear, but also resistance and solidarity. 
Polly Pallister-Wilkins’ contribution powerfully depicts the hotspot as a humanitarian 
space that rests on the existence of two specific rationalities: the effective 
management of disaster and the rationalisation of compassion. In relation to the 
former, Pallister-Wilkins eloquently demonstrates how order is re-established through 
the logic of sovereign protection: “in the hotspots, the border regime, biopolitical need, 
a politics of life and access to mobility become intertwined” (p. TBD). For instance, in 
light of the implementation of the 2015 EU-Turkey statement, hierarchies of mobility 
interact with particular hierarchies of vulnerability which then produce a further 
fragmentation of migration categories and allow some to escape the confines of the 
hotspot. At the same time, the hotspot is not limited merely to the carceral space of 
the camp but instead forms an entire array of transit points, transport infrastructure 
and reception facilities including satellite facilities, where the vulnerable are offered 
protection. Pallister-Wilkins (this issue) gives an insightful account of the co-optation 
of the extraordinary presence of volunteers wanting to fill the gaps of the institutional 
support that was meant to be provided by established humanitarian organisations. She 
meticulously traces and documents how the volunteers’ compassion was quickly 
mobilised in ways that were effective to the management of the ‘migration crisis’. In 
addition, the hotspot rationalises such compassion by regulating the moral force of 
those employed or voluntarily offering services through procedural, logistic and 
funding schemes that aim to avoid duplication and to enhance the efficacy of provision 
as a whole. Both local and transnational, the humanitarian geographies of the hotspot 
enable the effective management of the crisis and maintain the liberal European order. 
Next, Martina Tazzioli and Glenda Garelli (this issue) examine the changing 
character of the hotspot in terms of formal institutional policy and actually existing 
practice. Tazzioli and Garelli’s central argument is that hotspots should not be seen 
solely as detention facilities, but as flexible infrastructures of ‘containment beyond 
detention’. Containment cannot be reduced to detention, they suggest, because even 
when migrants’ movements beyond the confines of the hotspots are channelled, 
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regulated and governed by member-states, the European Commission and its 
agencies, they are still contained. This applies to arrivals that are granted protected 
status as legally recognised refugees, but who nevertheless have little say over where 
they will be permitted to live, as well as to those who are refused protection and 
channelled away from Europe. Migrants confronted with the hotspot who try to resist 
its logic are damned if they do and damned if they don’t: refusing identification and 
fingerprinting means  lingering in detention for months, while trying to avoid the hotspot 
process altogether inevitably entails vulnerability to exploitation and destititution.  
 Tazzioli and Garelli develop their account by tracing the genealogy of border 
hotspots, going back in time before the introduction of the current hotspot approach. 
They find not only that the formal role of the hotspot has evolved over time, but also 
that its practical operation and its impact have diverged from the officially designated 
functions. Since their introduction, hotspots have changed from “sites for regulating 
migrant arrivals by sea [to] places for migrants’ redistribution on land” (p. 2). They then 
consider containment beyond detention in two cases: the hotspots on the islands of 
Lampedusa, Italy, and Lesbos, Greece. In doing so they map what they call the ‘spatial 
productivity’ of the hotspots, as new forms of channelled and regulated movement are 
generated within Europe and new obstacles to migrants’ autonomous mobility are 
created and resisted. Governmental efforts to close down the possibilities for the 
autonomous mobility of migrants, dubbed ‘secondary movements’ by the EU, have 
led, according to the two authors, to the multiplication of ‘hotspot-like spaces’ at the 
EU’s internal borders, further fracturing the Schengen system of free movement within 
the EU. However, research also needs to attend to the hotspots’ “actually existing 
geographies, beyond the EU governmental vision and the accounts of the 
governmental actors involved in their implementation and management”. 
In our own contribution (Vradis et al, this issue) we introduce and develop the 
concept of ‘pop-up governance’ to capture recent transformations in the management 
of migration in the EU stemming from the implementation of the hotspot approach. We 
argue that the governance of migration in the age of the hotspot takes place at the 
intersection of humanitarianism and security mechanisms. Infused with the flexibility 
and adaptability that characterise both mechanisms, the management of those arriving 
on the island of Lesbos between 2015 and 2017 was guided by the same logic. A 
toolkit was eventually developed consisting of ephemeral, practice-based and easily 
retractable mechanisms that could be promptly deployed anywhere at any given time 
according to need. These mechanisms are neither the rule nor its exception but they 
point to a whole new socio-temporal function of governance. 
This ‘pop-up governance’ runs in parallel rather than opposition to the ever-
growing consolidation of and cooperation between the relevant EU agencies. The aim, 
we explain, is to manage what lies outside the realm of the ‘normal’ Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), the ‘exceptional flows’ of 2015. In other words, the 
aim is to de-exceptionalise these ‘exceptional flows’. At a time when the speed of 
developments – such as border closures in the Schengen area and reforms in the 
Greek asylum procedures – is unrelenting, governance and policy have to be swiftly 
adaptable to the new realities on the ground. This, in the case of the hotspot on 
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Lesbos, was achieved through the introduction of a form of ‘pop-up governance’. From 
the impromptu and arbitrary differentiation between Syrian nationals to the temporary 
allocation of people to places, ‘pop-up governance’ eventually emerged as the 
improvised response to the emergency on the ground, to the chaos of those first days 
after the ‘long summer’ of migration in 2015. The logics of humanitarianism and 
security were instrumental to this process, as separating and prioritising vulnerable 
subjects as well as ordering disorder were at the heart of this new form of governance. 
With a focus on place-specific and narrowly defined tasks at hand, ‘pop-up 
governance' is not opposed to normal governance. It is meant to complement, and to 
even facilitate it. 
The next contribution, by Matthew Sparke and Katharyne Mitchell (this issue), 
contrasts the top-down geopolitical construction of safe space, which has materialised 
in the creation of hotspots in the EU periphery, with the bottom-up creation of genuinely 
safe spaces through geosocial practices of solidarity in Greece. Sparke and Mitchell 
juxtapose the island hotspots with two grassroots solidarity initiatives, namely the 
Refugee Accommodation and Solidarity Space at the squatted hotel City Plaza in 
Athens and the self-organised migrant camp Lesbos Solidarity (formerly known as 
PIKPA) on the island of Lesbos. In the former case, the authors deconstruct the 
hotspot geopolitics overall, and justificatory and administrative constructions of safe 
space in particular. Working in tandem, these have served to actually endanger 
migrants by territorialising their mobility and subjecting them to unsafe living conditions 
in the hotspots. In the latter case, these two grassroots spaces have been constituted 
through actual practices that create genuine safe spaces for migrants, through what 
the authors call ‘geosocial solidarity practices’. These are embodied space-making 
strategies and struggles that promote migrant agency, autonomy, liberty and 
resistance. According to the authors, the solidarity activists’ understanding of “safe 
space” is in fact antagonistic to the dominant top-down constructs of migrant safety. 
For the authors, a safe space is a set of practices that are “distinguished by their mix 
of transnational but also personal and embodied modes of social justice inspired 
protection” (p. TBD). 
Drawing on critical border and citizenship studies, Sparke and Mitchell 
challenge the construction of migrants as either threats or victims, highlighting instead 
their agency and the bottom-up radical place-making efforts currently taking place 
across Europe. In addition, drawing on critical geopolitics, they employ and further 
develop the notion of ‘geosocial solidarity’ to talk about these connections and 
embodied practices that transcend and resist the border helping to sustain local 
organising and struggles. Finally, by contrasting these to the EU’s disingenuous 
geopolitical declarations about migrant safety, the authors demonstrate how the 
concept of, and the need for safe spaces has been deployed in order to territorialise 
and control migrant mobility, creating additional dangers for them along the way. 
Finally, Isla Spathopoulou and Anna Carastathis (this issue) offer a glimpse into 
how the ‘bordered reality’ is both imposed and resisted in the Greek territory today. 
Their paper draws from field research across the country including the islands of 
Lesbos, Samos and the city of Athens. Spathopoulou and Carastathis introduce the 
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notion of the ferry, this ‘mobile hotspot’ that transfers people between islands and the 
mainland, but while so doing acts as a sorting and channeling mechanism. They 
conclude their paper with an outline of ‘hotspots of resistance’: “migrants’ own 
attempts to resist [the border] reality”—that is, a reality comprising “militarised 
detention centres, racist segregation processes, segregated refugee camps, 
deportation schemes” (p. TBD). No matter how unfathomably powerful the authorities, 
the argument goes here, people will always find a way to resist power and its 
catastrophic decision-making. From an olive grove outside Moria in Lesbos to the town 
of Vathi in Samos, the authors show us how migrants actively refuse the imposed 
labelling and distinctions between them, and come together in these informal 
‘hotspots’ despite and against attempts to separate them. 
At its core, Spathopoulou and Carastathis’ contribution makes the vital 
argument that we must resist the naturalisation of dividing lines between land, sea, 
and sky, and the way in which they each in turn become prisons. Their article 
commences from the physicality and historicity of the hotspot in the Greek islands and 
mainland. As they convincingly point out, from the prison-camps of Junta dissidents in 
Greece (1967-1974) to Australian offshore prisons, totalitarian regimes are 
disproportionately attracted by the remoteness of the islands as spaces to isolate their 
enemies.  
         We should not lose sight of everyday acts of subversion and resistance to the 
increasing and intensified criminalisation of migrants and those that stand by their side. 
It is in fact imperative to intimately look at these embodied practices of resistance 
today and to reimagine what a subversion of the border might look like in these days 
of heightened racism and xenophobia, as exclusionary and nativist discourses rise 
across the continent. All around Europe, solidarity, care and mutual aid networks 
provide the tools for common struggles centred around increasing precarisation and 
shared vulnerabilities between migrants and non-migrants. In this struggle, critical 
researchers have a role to play by confronting and disrupting the logics and 
knowledges that shape the border (Loyd et al. 2012; Conlon and Gill 2015), by critically 
engaging with the racial, patriarchal, and colonial assumptions that underpin the 
border and humanitarian regimes (Cobarrubias & Casas-Cortes 2014; Garelli and 
Tazzioli 2013; Carastathis and Tsilimpounidi 2020), and by unsettling categorisations, 
dichotomies and boundaries (Cabot 2019; Gill 2019). We offer this collection as a 
contribution in this direction, as a move toward what will hopefully – what has to – be 
a continuous and reflective dialogue on how best to tackle the systemic structures 
leading to power excesses such as the ‘hotspot approach’, and how best to tackle and 
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